Stack buffer overflow in 9 of 10 Connector/ODBC catalog functions via unbounded name
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原文摘录
摘自原文（9738 字符中的一小部分）
Nine of the ten catalog functions in MariaDB Connector/ODBC escape an application-supplied identifier into a fixed 513-byte stack buffer without checking its length. Any name longer than 256 bytes overflows that buffer with attacker-controlled bytes. `SQLColumns`, `SQLPrimaryKeys`, `SQLStatistics`, …
原文中的代码
static int AddPvCondition(MADB_Dbc *dbc, void* buffer, size_t bufferLen, char* value, SQLSMALLINT len)
{
char escaped[2*NAME_LEN + 1];
/* We should probably compare to SQL_NTS, and throw error if just < 0, but I think this way it will work just fine */
if (len < 0)
{
len= …默认不展示报告全文。以上为简短摘录，完整复现过程请阅读原文。版权归研究员与 MariaDB 所有。
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阅读 HackerOne 原文 ↗作者 @fg0x0 · 版权归作者与 MariaDB 所有